U.S. Nuclear Threat to North Korea

Removal of U.S. Nuclear Threat to DPRK: Key to Signing of Safeguards Agreement with IAEA

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Foreword

The United States and some other Western countries have been alleging that North Korea may be seeking a nuclear weapons capability, citing as a major reason Pyongyang's "refusal" to permit inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to nuclear facilities in the country.

The United States has said the inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities by the IAEA is a crucial issue in improving Washington-Pyongyang relations. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon said in a speech on October 30, 1990 that "were the North Koreans to fulfil their obligations under the NPT, they would remove a major obstacle to the improvement of U.S.-DPRK relations."

Tokyo also has urged Pyongyang to sign and implement a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a condition for establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea.

Many observers, however, have paid little attention to the fact that North Korea has been threatened for decades with nuclear holocaust by the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Pyongyang has said that it is ready to sign a safeguards accord with the IAEA when "the United States removes its nuclear threat to us." North Korea is asking the United States for a "legal guarantee" that it will not use nuclear weapons against North Korea as a precondition for accepting full outside inspection of its nuclear facilities.

Pyongyang has in the past proposed negotiations with Washington and Seoul to make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free. The United States and South Korea, however, have ignored these repeated calls, and North Korea — as a last resort — has linked the inspection issue to the removal of the U.S. nuclear threat to the country.

In addition, there are growing criticisms among non-nuclear NPT signatories of the unfairness of the NPT. [The NPT is officially called "the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."] Many non-nuclear NPT signatories assert that the NPT is too much advantageous to the nuclear powers, including the United States and the United Kingdom, and disadvantageous to them. They have repeatedly called for effective international arrangements to protect non-nuclear states against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

So, North Korea is not the only country which asks the United States, a major nuclear power, storing nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, for a "legal guarantee" that it will not use nuclear weapons against the country in exchange for the signing of a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

This booklet discusses the need for the U.S. to remove its nuclear threat to North Korea and other important points concerning the issues involved.

Editor, Korean Report
March 1991

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I. U.S. Nuclear Threat to North Korea

For several years U.S. and other Western intelligence agencies have been alleging that North Korea is seeking a nuclear weapons capability. They cite as a major reason for the allegation Pyongyang's "reluctance" to sign and implement a full-scope safeguards, or inspection, agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), creating the impression that Pyongyang is soley responsible for its failure to sign the safeguards accord with the IAEA under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pyongyang signed the NPT in 1985.

Washington has said that the inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities by the IAEA is a crucial issue in improving U.S.-North Korean relations. Tokyo also went along with Washington in insisting that Pyongyang sign the safeguards accord with the IAEA during their first round of talks on normalizing Tokyo-Pyongyang relations held in the DPRK capital of Pyongyang on January 30-31, 1991.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon said in a January 17 speech to the Korean Society that "Pyongyang's continuing refusal to conclude a safeguards agreement quite naturally fuels suspicion about the objectives of its unsafeguarded nuclear program — casting doubt amongst North Korea's neighbors about its intentions." He also added, "These doubts and suspicions can only increase tensions in Northeast Asia and limit Pyongyang's welcome in the international community." **(From his speech as released by the State Department on January 22, 1991)**

At first glance Solomon's statement appears to hold water because there seems to be no reason for Pyongyang to refuse to accept IAEA inspectors if its nuclear program is entirely peaceful.

But we should not lose sight of an important point concerning the issues involved: the U.S. nuclear threat to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) or North Korea.

In fact North Korean officials have said that the DPRK is ready to sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA as a signatory to the NPT.

"An agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA has been reached in principle on the question of signing the accord," said North Korean Vice

Foreign Minister Chon In Chol in a January 30 news briefing in Pyongyang. "We are ready to sign it any time," Chon said.

But the North Koreans are demanding removal of the U.S. nuclear threat to their country and a "legal guarantee" that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against North Korea, as a condition for signing a safeguards accord with the IAEA. In a statement on November 16, 1990 the DPRK Foreign Ministry called for direct talks with Washington to discuss the matter.

Chon said in the January 30, 1991 news briefing that even the IAEA manifested its official view that its negotiations with the DPRK on the signing of the nuclear safeguards accord came to a close and said "an early realization of nuclear inspection will depend on future negotiations between the DPRK and the United States."

North Korea's position is that removal of the U.S. nuclear threat to the country and its legal guarantee of security are outside the authority of the IAEA and that direct DPRK-U.S. negotiations are essential for solving the inspection issue.

The NPT is based on the premise that the safety of non-nuclear nations should be guaranteed. Accordingly, the fulfilment of treaty obligations by the nuclear powers should have precedence over the obligations of non-nuclear NPT signatories.

The NPT stipulates that its signatories are under obligation to sign and implement a full-scope safeguards agreement, so that North Korea is required to commit itself to this obligation.

But, at the same time North Korea, as an NPT signatory, has the right to defend its existence and the right to demand guarantee of its security. This is precisely the reason why the North Koreans have demanded that

South Korean marines rush to secure positions from amphibious assault vehicles (LVT) on the southeast coast in a rehearsal for the Team Spirit 89 field exercises.

the United States give them legally binding assurances concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons in exchange for the signing of the safeguards accord.

DPRK Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam stressed in a February 1, 1991 press conference: "We may sign the nuclear safeguards accord, provided that a DPRK-U.S. negotiation is held and the nuclear threat is removed and the question of legal guarantee of security is solved through it."

Is NPT a Fair Treaty?

Washington, for its part, argues that the NPT's safeguards requirement is unconditional. Solomon insisted that "no other NPT party has set conditions for the acceptance of safeguards," saying that "to allow one country to set conditions would undermine the integrity of the NPT."

The fact is simply not true. Some 50 NPT signatories still refuse to accept safeguards, citing the unfairness of the treaty. They point out that the NPT is too much advantageous to the nuclear powers and disadvantageous to non-nuclear NPT signatories. Their argument holds water. The NPT, while allowing the United States and other nuclear powers to possess and develop nuclear weapons, does not meet the demand of many non-nuclear NPT signatories for security assurances.

There are growing calls among non-nuclear NPT signatories for international legal guarantees to protect non-nuclear states against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is true that the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution on security assurances sponsored by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States within the framework of the NPT on June 19, 1968. By it, the Security Council recognized that aggression or threat with nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power would call for immediate action by the Council and, above all, by its permanent members, the nuclear powers. The non-nuclear powers while welcoming these assurances, still do not regard them as providing a complete guarantee, and they have, therefore, repeatedly called for effective international arrangements to protect non-nuclear powers against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, Pyongyang is not alone in insisting on a "legal guarantee" from the United States, a nuclear power, that it will not use nuclear weapons against North Korea as a condition for signing the safeguards accord with the IAEA. There are many countries, including South Africa and Israel, which even refuse to sign the NPT itself.

A conference of the parties to the 1968 NPT took place in Geneva from

August 20 to September 15, 1990. But the Fourth NPT Review Conference ended without reaching consensus on a substantive final document. The failure to adopt an agreed document, for which unanimity is required, was caused mainly by differences regarding a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

Delegations from 84 states parties to the treaty participated in the conference, plus 15 observer states, including France and China. Forty-four non-governmental organizations and research institutes also attended as observers.

Before negotiations broke down on differences regarding a test ban, some 95 percent of the text of a final document had been tentatively agreed, including a number of measures to make the implementation of the treaty more effective. **(Disarmament Newsletter, October 1990, the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs)**

While many delegations stressed that significant progress in nuclear disarmament had been made since the previous Review Conference in 1985, a number of non-aligned states felt that the disarmament measures achieved were unsatisfactory in the absence of a clear undertaking to implement a complete ban on nuclear tests within a limited time frame. "It was not possible to have such an undertaking at this time since the commitment of the United States is to end testing as a long term goal," said the newsletter.

Consequently, it was not possible to bridge the differing views on how the issue of a test ban should be treated in the final document.

[As of the end of 1989, 142 countries signed the NPT. There are such countries as South Africa and Israel which refuse to sign the NPT while being IAEA members.]

U.S. Continues to Threaten DPRK with Nuclear Attack

In addition, in his speech on January 17, Solomon had the impudence to say that "... I can say without reservation that we pose no nuclear threat to North Korea." His remarks clearly contradict Washington's past records and realities on the Korean Peninsula.

It is widely acknowledged that successive U.S. governments and U.S. military officials have publicly mentioned the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons in Korea and that the United States has deployed a great number of nuclear weapons in South Korea. **(See Appendix D)**

Before President Dwight D. Eisenhower threatened China and North Korea with the use of atomic weapons in 1953, advised by the U.S. Joint Strategic Planning Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already considered numer-

F-16 Fighting Falcon: Last year, a new U.S. squadron of 24 F-16 fighters modified for night operations arrived in South Korea.

ous proposals to attack Korea and China with nuclear weapons during the early 1950s. The Committee had proposed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended, and President Truman had approved the establishment of U.S. nuclear delivery capability.

In March 1951, a Johns Hopkins University research group, under contract to the Far East Command in Tokyo, submitted an immense report to General MacArthur entitled "Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons." **("Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons," Operations Research Group, Johns Hopkins University Report to Operations Research Office, Far East Command, March 1, 1951)** The newly declassified study noted that:

> The Korean War has offered an excellent opportunity for the study of the tactical employment of atomic bombs in support of ground forces. It has been possible to consider the war a kind of laboratory within which everything was at hand in the most realistic proportions, except the bomb itself and the means to deliver it.

A covering memorandum from the Far East Command in July 1951 reveals that the study, while not yet adopted as Army policy, was far from academic. "This headquarters," stated General Doyle Hickey, "is continuing study of [the] report with a view to taking any actions that may be indicated to prepare the Far East Command offensively and defensively for possible employment of nuclear weapons."

The report revealed, however, that Far East Command faced major obstacles to conducting nuclear war in Korea. Applying the "Hiroshima Death Function" to a variety of actual battle situations in the Korean War, the study demonstrated that there were many "lucrative" military targets for nuclear attack. One such attack would have employed ten 40 kiloton nuclear bombs dropped just 6.5 km apart to "neutralize" the "Pyongyang-Chorwon-Kumhwa Triangle" — that is, to destroy the North Korean capital city and surrounds. The authors noted that such nuclear attacks would kill many civilians, which they termed a "distorting consideration." They suggested that destroying 10,000 enemy troops with a nuclear attack was worth killing 500 "friendly civilians," although they were "reluctant" to recommend killing 50,000 civilians for the same gain.

The report also found that U.S. forces in Korea were ill equipped for nuclear warfare. Few American soldiers and practically no allied forces had received "atomic indoctrination" in safety and radiological protection, and by January 1951, only two radiological defense officers had been trained. Furthermore, the lack of adequate roads and bridges precluded the use in Korea of Army nuclear artillery which moved on cumbersome, heavy equipment.

Deterred by these obstacles from actually using nuclear weapons in the ground war in Korea, the report recommended staff training to "perform all the *real* staff work required to plan and execute *simulated* atomic attacks on targets as they develop." The staff training was to be matched with combat training for B-29 delivery of nuclear bombs, "to fly simulated atomic sorties against real enemy targets . . . as a part of an actual bomber or fighter strike with conventional weapons or immediately after such a strike." The report recommended: "These test sorties should be made as realistic as possible in all details except that conventional rather than atomic explosions would be used."

Accordingly, from late September to October 15, 1951, several simulated nuclear strikes were conducted as *Exercise Hudson Harbor* in Korea. **(R. Watson and J. Schnabel, "The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy," Volume III, The Korean War, Part 2, 1979)** These exercises laid the groundwork for the May 15, 1953 National Security Council meeting where Eisenhower argued that nuclear weapons were cheaper in Korea than conventional weapons. To make the threat clear, the 92nd B-36 Bomb Wing flew to Japan, Okinawa, and Guam for a month-long exercise, *Operation Big Stick* in August-September 1953. The official Strategic Air Command history states that *Big Stick* "demonstrated the U.S. determination to use every means possible to maintain peace in the Far East." Not to be outdone, the aircraft carrier u.s.s. *Champlain* with four nuclear bombers aboard cruised off the Korean coast, waiting for the attack order.

The threats continued even after the Armistice was signed in July 1953. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State recommended in January 1954 that if hostilities were renewed in Korea, the U.S. should employ "atomic weapons . . . against military targets in Korea and against those military targets in Manchuria and China which are being used by the Communists in direct support of these operations in Korea, or which threaten the security of U.S./U.N. forces in the Korean area."

Just how close Eisenhower came to using his nuclear option is revealed in the record of a National Security Council meeting on May 20, 1953. Eisenhower's "only real worry" about the Joint Chiefs' view that "more positive action" would entail nuclear attack on China was the possibility of Soviet intervention. "He feared the Chinese much less," stated the record, "since the blow would fall so swiftly and with such force as to eliminate Chinese Communist intervention." **(The New York Times, "For Eisenhower, 2 Goals If Bomb Was to Be Used," June 8, 1984)**

Eisenhower's nuclear threats in Korea were part and parcel of "massive retaliation" — the defense doctrine of his administration. This meant, as Dulles put it, that the U.S. would "depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing." Retaliatory capacity meant, in the first instance, that the Strategic Air Command would be able to deliver an overwhelming hail of nuclear bombs. **(See "American Lake, Nuclear Peril in the Pacific," pp. 50-54)**

U.S. Has 151 Nuclear Warheads in South Korea?

So far, little attention has been paid to the fact that North Korea has been threatened for decades with nuclear destruction by the presence of U.S. atomic weapons in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula.

It is a fact, little-known but true, that South Korea is the only place in the world where nuclear weapons face a non-nuclear "foe," namely North Korea.

In August 1957, only four years after the Armistice Agreement was signed, the United States announced itself free of "any restraints" imposed by the Armistice Agreement on the introduction of arms.

Within a few weeks after the announcement, the United States began locating in South Korea atomic warheads, bombs, shells, missiles and mines. **(Gregory Henderson, "30 Years Later: Lessons from the Korean Armistice," The Christian Science Monitor, July 27, 1983)**

The 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement said that the Commanders of the opposing sides shall "(d.) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type." **(Article II, Paragraph 13, d.)**

In violation of the above-mentioned agreed points, the United States continued to deploy a variety of new weapons, including nuclear weapons, in South Korea.

In the mid-1970s, it was generally accepted that the United States kept over six hundred nuclear weapons in South Korea. [The Defense Monitor, published by the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, put the total number of U.S. nuclear weapons at 661-686 in January 1976.]

One authoritative Western source has put the current stockpile at 151: 60 aircraft bombs, 40 8-inch artillery shells, 30 155mm artillery shells, and 21 atomic demolition munitions (ADMs, or land mines). The source cited Kunsan Air Base as the storage location for those nuclear weapons. **(William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, "Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race," Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985)** [The storage location for U.S. nuclear weapons cited by the source was indirectly confirmed at a March 11, 1986 closed hearing of the House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee. A transcript of the closed hearing said that the Pentagon had a plan to build a total of 415 new underground nuclear weapons storage facilities at 26 air bases in Europe and South Korea. The special storage vaults meant for nuclear weapons included 36 at Kunsan Air Base in South Korea.] **(See Appendix C)**

W48: 155mm nuclear artillery projectile with inert warhead.

The U.S. Army deployed a battery of nuclear-capable Lance missiles in South Korea on February 9, 1987, which became operational in early March. **(Commander U.S. Forces Korea, "Quarterly Report to SecDef," cable 050310Z to Commander-in-Chief Pacific, March 1987)** The Lance missile is capable of carrying a neutron bomb. It is possible that the



A Lance missile: The U.S. deployed a battery of Lance missiles in South Korea in February 1987, which became operational in early March. The Lance missile is capable of carrying a neutron bomb.

United States has deployed Lance nuclear warheads called W70s there.

An American defense expert pointed out that while some nuclear weapons have been withdrawn, others have probably been replaced with newer weapons — older single yield weapons replaced with new selectable yield weapons, giving greater flexibility. For example, there are probably some of the new B-61 tactical nuclear bombs for aircraft stationed in South Korea. The B-61 has four yield options, from one hundred to five hundred kilotons. [The bomb dropped on Hiroshima was about 12 kilotons.] **(Stephen Goose, "The Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula," a paper contained in a book entitled "Two Koreas — One Future?" published by the American Friends Service Committee, University Press of America, 1987)**

Former U.S. Army Chief: Nuclear Option Far Simpler in Korea than in Europe

Former U.S. Army Chief General Edward Meyer made a controversial statement in January 1983 while visiting Seoul, that escalation to nuclear war is "far simpler here than in Europe where consultations have to be made with 15 different sovereign nations."

Daniel Ellsberg, a key figure behind the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers, which gave ammunition to the campaign against the Vietnam War, told The People's Korea in June 1981 that nuclear weapons stored in South Korea are for the first strike against North Korea.

Thousands of South Korean troops cross the Han River, northeast of Seoul, as part of the Team Spirit 86 war game.

"U.S. planning has always been based on a readiness to initiate nuclear operations in the event of conflicts. For that purpose, nuclear weapons have always been stored in Korea as well," said "Dr. Pentagon Papers."

"The U.S. planning," Ellsberg said, "has always allowed for a possibility that the U.S. aircraft or missiles strike first."

He added, "The U.S. planning . . . does not require any expectation that the adversary has the capability to launch nuclear strikes or air strikes at all, or is about to do so." **(The People's Korea, June 20, 1981)**

In addition, the U.S.-ROK joint military exercise Team Spirit which started in 1976 is a dangerous war game, billed by the Americans themselves as the "largest combined war game in the Western world." Team Spirit's scenario hypothesizes the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Korea.

The annual war game entered on a more dangerous phase in the early 1980s when the United States began to adopt the AirLand Battle doctrine for the Team Spirit war game.

The U.S. Army adopted the AirLand Battle doctrine as its basic operational concept in September 1982 and began to apply the doctrine to the Team Spirit maneuver in 1983. The doctrine places primary emphasis on offensive operations, stressing an effective use of nuclear and chemical weapons.

The United States has been engaged in nuclear weapons training in South Korea for a long time, because using nuclear weapons requires advanced planning, training and logistic support. A U.S. official document said that U.S. training in tactical nuclear bombing with mock weapons that duplicate the weight and shape of real nuclear bombs take place in South Korea, Canada, Italy, Spain, Turkey, West Germany, the Netherlands, France, Britain, the

Philippines and Japan. **(The House Armed Services Committee, FY 1982, the Department of Defense)**

Much of the nuclear weapons training overseas is primarily related to the deployment of forces.

In view of the presence of a great number of nuclear weapons and the continuing Team Spirit joint military exercises whose scenario hypothesizes the use of tactical nuclear weapons against North Korea, Pyongyang's demand for legally binding security assurances concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons is by no means unreasonable.

It is quite natural that the North Koreans should view the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea as a serious threat to their survival.

Thus it stands to reason that Pyongyang has linked the inspection issue to removal of the U.S. nuclear threat to the country.

The Americans should sit at the negotiating table with the North Koreans to remove Pyongyang's concern as the only major power which deploys nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, threatening the DPRK with the annual Team Spirit war game presupposing nuclear war.

M198 155mm towed gun.

Need for Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula

Voices calling for withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea are growing in connection with the inspection issue as well as with the current situation surrounding the peninsula. **(See Appendix A)**

Neither the Soviet Union nor China have troops or nuclear weapons in North Korea. Seoul has succeeded in improving relations with Pyongyang's traditional communist allies, including the Soviet Union and China. Pyongyang and Tokyo have started their official talks on normalizing relations. More importantly, many military experts believe that the military balance on the Korean Peninsula has swung increasingly in favor of the South. They argue that there is no convincing rationale for the retention of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea.

The New York Times in its February 4, 1991 editorial said:

"... Pyongyang signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, but it resents having its nuclear facilities singled out while the 40,000 U.S. troops on the peninsula keep nuclear arms.

"Washington could meet Pyongyang's concerns by beginning to withdraw its nuclear weapons."

The Defense Monitor (Vol. XIX, Number 2, 1990) pointed out that "withdrawing our nuclear weapons and making sure South Korea does not start

"We Want No War Game!": Two South Korean women grimly display the lead practice bombs dropped by U.S. and South Korean planes in target bombing on Kuni Range during the Team Spirit 89 exercise. Villagers near the target range, "which is important to the training of both U.S. and South Korean militaries," are angry about its presence.

building them would remove any reason for the North Koreans to develop their own."

"U.S. withdrawal would put strong pressure on them to conclude their negotiation on IAEA inspection of their nuclear facilities," it said.

Rep. Stephen Solarz, chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, in a September 1990 seminar in Washington, suggested that the United States propose a "nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula in which North and South Korea, the U.S., the Soviet Union and China all agree to neither develop nor deploy nuclear weapons, in exchange for which North and South Korea agree to full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities."

B61 bomb with parachute drogue deployed.

More recently, a report published by a group of American and South Korean specialists on February 12, 1991 claimed that (U.S.) nuclear weapons can be removed from South Korea "without affecting its security."

"There are valuable political reasons for the South Korean government to be able to say that there are no nuclear weapons stored on its soil since deterrence and defense of South Korea do not depend on having nuclear weapons stored in South Korea," said a report released simultaneously in Washington and Seoul by the Committee on U.S.-Republic of Korea Relations, which was established in 1989 by the East-West Center in Honolulu and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs.

This particular report is notable because the East-West Center is funded partly by the U.S. government and receives important donations from South Korea. The members of the committee include a former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, a former South Korean defense minister, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, and a former South Korean ambassador to the United States.

Even a high-ranking U.S. military official stressed the unnecessity of deploying atomic weapons in South Korea. In a September 12, 1988 conference in Seoul, Lieutenant General John Cushman (retired) who served as commanding general of the ROK-U.S. First Corps Group, argued that nuclear weapons are not necessary to defend South Korea and that they serve only to fuel anti-American

sentiment that could undermine the alliance.

The retired U.S. general said that General Louis Menetrey, commander of the U.S. forces in South Korea (at the time), has mentioned the unnecessity of deploying nukes in South Korea.

The Soviet Union, a long-time ally of North Korea, also favors the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons.

A Soviet expert wrote for a Hong Kong-based weekly magazine: "The withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula might be of historic importance as a step in promoting the normalization of the situation there. All countries of the region are interested in that." **(Vladimir Ivanov, head of the Pacific Research Department of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the Far Eastern Economic Review, January 12, 1989)**

Recently, even South Koreans have begun to question the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the country, though it was illegal to even talk in public about military matters, let alone nuclear weapons in the past.

South Korean citizens have directly tackled the taboo issue. In September 1987, for example, a group of citizen organizations wrote an open letter to the South Korean military asking embarrassing questions about the taboo topic. How many nuclear weapons are deployed in South Korea? they asked. Don't nuclear weapons in Korea increase the risk of nuclear war which thousands of Koreans have already seen at Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Isn't control wholly in the hands of the Americans?

In the late 1980s, many South Korean public organizations began to openly call for withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons. **(See Appendix B)**

The withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons and Washington's legal commitment against the use of them will surely lead to Pyongyang's acceptance of IAEA inspection and thus will remove Washington's "fear" of nuclear proliferation on the peninsula. After all, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and eventual stability in East Asia hinge on the U.S. withdrawing its atomic weapons from South Korea.

DPRK's Consistent Non-Nuclear Policy

In the past Pyongyang has consistently followed a non-nuclear policy, proposing negotiations with Washington and Seoul to make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free, while Washington and Seoul have always ignored these repeated calls.

North Korean officials have publicly stated that the DPRK has neither

intention nor ability to produce or develop nuclear weapons.

A North Korean participant in a May 1989 seminar in Washington said, "...we have always favored turning Korea into a nuclear-free zone, since after all, Korea is a small place and if there is a nuclear explosion on Korean territory no one could be safe." **(Dialogue with North Korea: Report of a Seminar on "Tension Reduction in Korea," the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 30-31, 1989)**

The DPRK's non-nuclear policy is based on the belief that the presence of nuclear weapons itself is the source of nuclear war and military confrontation.

As its first commitment to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) signed a joint declaration on the establishment of a Northeast Asian regional nuclear-free, peace zone with the Social Democratic Party of Japan (formally called the Japan Socialist Party).

The joint declaration signed on March 16, 1981 said, "All the nuclear weapons deployed in Northeast Asian region should be withdrawn and destroyed and the development, test, production, possession, carriage, storage, shipment and use of nuclear and biochemical weapons in this region be totally prohibited."

In 1986, one year after the DPRK signed the NPT, the DPRK government issued a three-point statement calling for a nuclear-free Korea, which was endorsed by North Korea's two major allies, the Soviet Union and China.

The three-point offer contained in the June 23, 1986 government statement was as follows:

1) The DPRK government will refrain from the testing and production, stockpiling and introduction of nuclear weapons, and will not permit the establishment of any foreign military bases, including nuclear bases, and will not allow the foreign nuclear weapons to pass through its territory, territorial



F-18 Hornet: The U.S. and South Korea plan to co-produce 120 nuclear capable F-18 fighter-bombers. The F/A-18 is the latest high-performance aircraft to enter service with U.S. forces.

airspace or territorial waters;

2) The government of the United States, in keeping with the desire of the Korean people and the world's peace-loving people to turn the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, must take steps to stop the introduction of new-type nuclear weapons into South Korea, reduce phase by phase all the already-introduced weapons and further withdraw them completely and abolish all operational plans on the usage of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula; and

3) If the U.S. government and the South Korean authorities deem it necessary to hold any negotiation regarding our proposal on turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, the DPRK government will respond to such a negotiation at any time, irrespective of its formality.

On July 13, 1987, the DPRK government reiterated its stand on a nuclear-free zone on the peninsula and urged:

- the U.S. government to take practical steps to stop the introduction of new nuclear weapons and their delivery systems into South Korea, completely withdraw all the already-introduced nuclear weapons and cancel all operational plans relating to the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula;
- the Japanese government to work to prevent its territory from being used as a nuclear sortie base, relay base, and supply base of other countries against the Korean Peninsula;
- all the nuclear powers to stop all military actions which may cause a nuclear war in or around the Korean Peninsula and refrain from threatening the Korean Peninsula with nuclear weapons;
- the South Korean authorities to withdraw from the area nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, military bases, including nuclear bases of other countries, refrain from the introduction and storage of nuclear weapons and their development and possession, and not to allow the passage of nuclear weapons of other countries through their territory in future.

In its renewed efforts for a nuclear-free Korea, North Korea in November 1989 formally proposed to the United States and South Korea to hold talks on the matter in Geneva or any other place.

The proposal made in a November 9 Foreign Ministry statement was of a new kind.

The new elements were the proposed inclusion of Korean territorial waters and airspace within the nuclear-free zone and a call for a North-South joint declaration on the issue. The proposal was also the first to cover the question of legal guarantees by the nuclear powers concerning Korea's nuclear-free status.

The Foreign Ministry statement said that the question of turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone is an issue to be discussed by the North

and South. "But, since U.S. nuclear weapons are actually deployed in South Korea, tripartite talks between the DPRK, the U.S. and South Korea should be held to discuss and solve the problem of withdrawing those nuclear weapons."

It said that if the tripartite talks reach an agreement on the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons, North and South Korea should hold further talks to adopt a joint declaration on turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and to demand legal guarantees from the nuclear powers.

The proposal said that the joint declaration should establish the Korean Peninsula, its airspace and its 12 mile territorial waters as a nuclear-free zone and outlaw the test, production, storage and development of nuclear weapons by North and South alike.

The joint declaration, Pyongyang urged, should also ban the deployment of foreign nuclear weapons, the entrance, exit and passage of foreign nuclear-armed vessels and aircraft; and it should ensure mutual supply of information and specify verification procedures covering the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea and the implementation of commitments made by North and South Korea.

These concrete proposals reflect a firm determination on the part of the North Korean government to remove the danger of nuclear war from the peninsula and to remain a non-nuclear power, notwithstanding the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea.

II. American Nuclear Forces in South Korea

Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky and Walden Bellow, the authors of "American Lake, Nuclear Peril in the Pacific," (Viking-Penguin, New York, 1987) have made a critical review of American nuclear strategy in Korea in their essay.

They assert in the essay entitled "Pacific Powderkeg: Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea" completed in June 1988 that "the thaw in the second Cold War symbolized by the INF agreement has not reduced hostility in Korea," adding that "it is urgent to reverse the current drift in American policy in directions which degrades the security of all parties to the Korean conflict, including the United States."

The authors insist that the current American posture is dangerous and that less risky alternatives are available.

"Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, American policy has been premised on maintaining the division of the peninsula. Indeed, American military strategy and diplomatic posture have not only maintained but have hardened the stand-off," they observe.

They say nuclear war is more conceivable in Korea than in the other two possible nuclear flashpoints, Europe and the Middle East, on two counts: firstly the likelihood that a war can break out which might involve both superpowers; secondly, the likelihood that the superpowers would then use nuclear weapons in that war.

They come up with a five-point proposal as necessary ingredients of alternative policy package: 1) Denuclearize Korea; 2) Democratization (in the South); 3) Recognition of North Korea (by the United States); 4) Troop withdrawal, force reduction and arms control; and 5) Neutrality and a new order in Korea.

Some of their assertions have been shared by Pyongyang. North Korea has been urging both Washington and Moscow to reduce their forces in the Asia-Pacific region as they have done so in Europe.

North Korea's Foreign Ministry in a January 13, 1991 statement called for the establishment of a new security system for Asia "in an Asian manner." But the statement called on the two superpowers which have huge military forces in the region to start disarmament process before any one else as a "prerequisite to establishing an Asian security system."

The essay is divided into seven chapters: 1. Security Dilemma in Korea; 2. American Nuclear Forces in Korea; 3. Risk of Nuclear War; 4. North Korea — Hall of Mirrors; 5. North Korea — Offensive Defense?; 6. Controlling Non-Proliferation; and 7. Breaking the Deadlock.

Here are excerpts from Chapter 2: American Nuclear Forces in Korea:

The United States faces a very different situation in Korea than in Europe, the other major land "theater" in which it deploys tactical nuclear weapons. Alliances in the Pacific are bilateral, not multilateral like NATO. As a result, the United States has always had a much freer hand in determining policy and deployments in Korea than in Europe.

Second, unlike Europe, the adversary in Korea is not nuclear-armed. North Korea has been subjected to nuclear threat for a longer period and with greater intensity than any other non-nuclear state. Third, Korea is far more politically and militarily volatile than Europe, having telescoped the experience of brutal colonialism, suffered partition at the end of world war, and undergone a transition from a traditional, largely agrarian society to two modern, industrialized societies, one capitalist and another socialist, all in one century. Finally, the power alignments in East Asia are far more fluid than in Europe which is divided by one iron curtain.

Consequently, nuclear doctrine and deployments in Korea evolved at different pace than in Europe. New weapons and strategic shifts often arrived after they appeared in Europe, due to the predominance of Europe in the U.S. Army's mission. As a result, obsolete weapons and strategy stayed on in Korea long after they were removed or revised in Europe. Incongruous strategies and weapons developed for conditions in Europe were introduced into Korea without much thought. Just as in Europe, however, U.S. Army nuclear deployments and strategy were driven by ad hoc considerations of bureaucratic advantage, service rivalry, and technological innovation.

Current Strategy: Nuclear strategy in Korea is an incoherent mix of disparate elements. Lacking political guidance, warplanners have proceeded myopically to develop targets and procedures based on campaign analysis, and informed by the legacy of past doctrines dressed up with the latest nuclear fashion from Europe.

The hangover from the past can be best described as Inflexible Responses — a combination of the residue of Massive Retaliation from the fifties with Flexible Response from the sixties. Onto this hybrid growth has been grafted AirLand Battle doctrine, the outcome of doctrinal turmoil in the Army between 1980 and 1982 which had upended its philosophy of "active defense."

In its place the Army developed a totally new doctrine called AirLand Battle. Army officers, who typically rotate to Korea for one year or less, quickly transmitted AirLand Battle to Korea, where it was first tested in the 1983 Team Spirit exercise. The new strategy is important because it projects — on paper at least — an entirely new level of retaliatory and pre-emptive threat against North Korea.

This new doctrine upgraded maneuver warfare over the application of static firepower, whether nuclear or conventional. More importantly, it introduced the idea of deep strike at the opponent's support forces well behind the forward battle zone and integrated small, accurate nuclear weapons into the strategy.

At first, firepower remained dominant. But later, maneuver was further upgraded to the central principle driving Army doctrine. In short, the U.S. military was moving from a gridiron football-style blocking strategy combined with a limited active defense to a more fluid, soccer-style offensive defense.

In this deep strike strategy, nuclear weapons were seen to provide a variety of options. Barriers, conventional maneuvering forces, and nuclear attack could be used to canalize the antagonist into killing zones. A 1982 report to the Defense Nuclear Agency on Army nuclear operations using the new philosophy states:

> In summary, nuclear weapons are used in the defense to destroy assault forces and follow-on echelons before they penetrate the main battle area; to destroy or disrupt logistics support formations, to create obstacles and canalize enemy forces into preferred areas, to blunt or stop a penetration, to destroy enemy forces in the penetration, to control terrain, as an economy of force, to create opportunities for offensive actions, to protect forces during counterattacks, and as highly flexible reserves.

In 1984, Team Spirit tested "Cross-FLOT (forward line of own troops) operations." The exercise included an "air-mobile operation" over the "forward line" in Korea, that is, over the DMZ, for an offensive into North Korea. Moreover, the Combined Forces Command's warplan (known as OPLAN 5027) incorporates the new strategy. According to reliable sources, the revised OPLAN envisages inserting Special Forces into North Korea as soon as war begins. After five or six days of defensive indecisive battle along the DMZ, Korean Marines are meant to grab beachheads near Pyongyang and Wonsan. The South Korean Third Army's 7th Corps (now headquartered at Annyang as a swing force) would try to break through the North Korean lines on the DMZ and head for Pyongyang. American military officers plan on the belief that they would reach the northern capital in about two weeks at which time the war is supposed to end.

Nuclear Forces in Korea: To support this offensive strategy, the United States has upgraded the forces dedicated to nuclear war in Korea. Little information exists in public print about these forces.

In its internal telephone book, however, the 8th Army lists a Plans and Operations Nuclear Division in South Korea. The Division has three branches which cover nuclear plans and operations, control of the weapons and emergency disposal. According to the Organization and Functions Manual of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the Division "analyzes nuclear targets," "performs nuclear fireplanning," and "prepares nuclear contingency plans."

Command and Control: The United States also maintains an infrastructure for the command and control of nuclear weapons in Korea, which is as crucial to American nuclear capability as the weapons themselves. U.S. Eighth Army Headquarters is responsible for operations and training involving Emergency Action Messages (nuclear fire-orders) and procedures, the physical security of the weapons, and the reliability of nuclear personnel. The latter function is coordinated by the Eighth Army's Nuclear Surety Team supported by the 8th Personnel Command.

Nuclear Communications: Communicating nuclear fire orders requires special U.S.-owned and controlled communications system. The requisite Emergency Action Consoles for communicating nuclear fire orders and codes are located at the U.S.-South Korean TANGO and Command Post Seoul Headquarters, linking to another Emergency Action Facility which uses teletype at the Combined Field Army Bunker at Camp Red Cloud. The 2nd Infantry Division's Operation's Division is responsible for operating the Division's Tactical Operations Center at Camp Casey, as well as the Division's Emergency Action Facility.

Logistics: The Operations Branch of the 78th Ordnance Detachment at Camp Ames (Taejon) is responsible for the "training and certification of personnel for duties to include convoy training, Emergency Destruction (ED), Emergency Evacuation (EV), Emergency Action Messages (EAM), and Permissive Action Link (PAL) training for the unit," as well as certifying that nuclear weapons have been properly calibrated. This technical work is likely conducted at the Detachment's facilities at Kunsan Air Base, where it maintains a "calibration building" and a rear storage site.[1] The 833rd Ordnance Company of the 78th Detachment is referred to as "Spec Ammo" and probably handles nuclear weapons for the Detachment in wartime. That the 78th Detachment is nuclear-capable is evidenced by the Eighth Army's "Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection" of the unit in November 1985.

Many of these disparate functions are gathered together by the Weapons Support Detachment-Korea (WSD-K), which also links the American nuclear organization and capabilities to the South Korean military. The Commander of WSD-K is headquartered at Yongsan Base inside the U.S. Forces Korea Nuclear Plans and Operations Division (in Building 2462). The bulk of the WSD-K staff, however, are located at Camp Page. WSD-K has Liaison Teams posted with the U.S.-South Korean Combined Field Army in the Artillery Element at Camp Red Cloud; and in the Combat Support Coordination Team at Camp Long which coordinates South Korean support and involvement in nuclear operations — activity which may be illegal under the U.S. Atomic Energy Law.

Nuclear Defenses: Plans to use nuclear weapons in Korea necessitate extensive preparations to deal with the inevitable radioactive fallout plumes. To this end, the 2nd Infantry Division NBC (Nuclear Biological and Chemical) Center functions within the Division's Tactical Operations Center at Camp Casey. Capable of 24 hour operation, the NBC Center is activated only during field deployment of the Division. In peacetime, the NBC Center conducts the NBC School, which ensures that unit level NBC Defense officers are properly instructed. It also directs the NBC Technical Evaluation Team, which evaluates the competence of all company-level NBC Teams in the Division.

In wartime, the NBC Center would send out STRIKE WARN messages to U.S.-South Korean forces of impending nuclear attacks by U.S. forces. It is charged with estimating "the effects of enemy and friendly nuclear detonations and makes fallout predictions." It would also track fallout plumes and predict fallout patterns on an "NBC situation map," and send "downwind messages" to threatened units.

Storage and Delivery Systems: Kunsan Air Base is a key storage site for the American nuclear arsenal in South Korea. In early 1985, there were reportedly 60 nuclear gravity bombs stored at Kunsan for loading into nuclear-capable F-4 and F-16 fighter bombers. There were also said to be 21 atomic demolition mines[2] and 70 nuclear artillery shells for the Army. The Army deployed a battery of nuclear-capable Lance missiles to Korea on February 9, 1987, and became operational in early March. It is not known if Lance nuclear warheads have also been sent to Korea.

Offshore, the Navy's 7th Fleet supports the Army's land-based arsenal with an array of nuclear weapons, including air-delivered gravity bombs which would be launched from aircraft carriers. Surface warships and submarines have long been armed with anti-submarine nuclear rockets and depth charges which could attack North Korean submarines. Since June 1984,

American ships and subs have also carried Tomahawk sea-launched land attack nuclear cruise missiles, designed in part to attack heavily defended command posts and airfields as are found in North Korea.

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ENDNOTES:

1. Forty 203mm and 30 155mm artillery shells were reportedly stored at Kunsan in early 1985. The Army also keeps battalions of M-198 and M-109 nuclear-capable artillery at Camp Stanley, between Seoul and the DMZ, and reportedly, a forward contingency nuclear weapons storage site at Tobongsan Ammunition Center near Uijongbu, between Seoul and the DMZ. **(Commander U.S. Forces Korea, "Quarterly Report to SecDef," cable 050310Z to CINCPAC, March 1987, p.232)** Warheads for South Korean Honest John missiles may also be kept at Kunsan.

2. The Medium ADMs formerly stockpiled at Kunsan have now been dismantled and can therefore presumed to have been removed. **("Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume II: U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production" 1987, Table 2-1, pp.10-11)**

Appendix A

What Americans Are Saying

There are growing calls among Americans for withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea. Here are some of their voices:

In a September 12, 1988 conference held in Seoul, ***Lieutenant General John Cushman (retired), former commanding general of the ROK-U.S. First Corps Group***, argued that nuclear weapons are not necessary to defend South Korea and that nuclear weapons serve only to fuel anti-American sentiment that could undermine the alliance and that their removal would preempt demands by students and others.

The retired U.S. general said that General Louis Menetrey, commander of the U.S. forces in South Korea, has mentioned the unnecessity of deploying nukes in South Korea.

Rep. Stephen Solarz, chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, in a September 1990 seminar in Washington, suggested that the United States propose a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula in which North and South Korea, the U.S., the Soviet Union and China all agree to neither develop nor deploy nuclear weapons. In exchange, North and South Korea would also agree to full-scope safeguards on all nuclear facilities, he said.

The leading Democratic Congressman told a forum sponsored by the Heritage Foundation that a new approach is needed "because the Soviet Union and China have failed to persuade their North Korean ally through diplomacy to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection."

"Next to the Persian Gulf and possibly Kashmir, there is no other area of the world where there continues to be a very real possibility of major hostilities . . . with catastrophic consequences . . . than the Korean Peninsula," said Solarz.

"While unenthusiastic about nuclear-free zones, the United States has agreed to one in Latin America," Solarz noted.

Earlier, Solarz said in his comment contributed to The Los Angeles Times dated December 12, 1988 that "in order to head off South Korea's nascent anti-nuclear movement before it grows to significant proportions, the United States could also remove nuclear weapons that it may have in the country."

Quoting senior U.S. military officials as saying that they can imagine no conceivable scenario in which they would use nuclear weapons in Korea, Solarz observed: "It stands to reason, then, that since these weapons perform no useful purpose, their removal would not diminish our defense posture. Yet it would enhance our political position."

He stressed that the time has come for the United States to review its policy on the Korean Peninsula.

John W. Lewis, Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University, said in an interview with the Japanese daily Mainichi Shimbun that the U.S. should withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea as soon as possible to help promote inter-Korean dialogue. ***(The Mainichi Shimbun, December 12, 1988)***

Supporting the three-way talks proposed by Pyongyang, Lewis said, "I think the three-way conference can be held in two different methods — first North and South Korea meet together before the United States joins them or start the conference with the participation of the three parties involved from the beginning. I think the United States should take part in the conference because it maintains troops on the Korean Peninsula."

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"There are valuable political reasons for the South Korean government to be able to say that there are no nuclear weapons stored on its soil since deterrence and defense of South Korea do not depend on having nuclear weapons stored in South Korea."

— A report published by the Committee on U.S.-Republic of Korea Relations, February 12, 1991 —

"While Cold War frost still chills U.S. diplomacy in Korea, Japan and North Korea have begun breaking the ice. Their first round of talks on normalizing

relations ended inconclusively last week, but North Korea's new flexibility offers promise when talks resume next month.

"Washington now needs to follow Tokyo's lead, establishing ties with the North and scaling down its military exercises and nuclear arsenal in Korea.

"... Pyongyang signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, but it resents having its nuclear facilities singled out while the 40,000 U.S. troops on the peninsula keep nuclear arms.

"Washington could meet Pyongyang's concerns by beginning to withdraw its nuclear weapons. It could also reduce the scale and frequency of military exercises in the area. That would encourage North Korea to negotiate tension-reducing arms curbs with the South."

— Excerpts from a New York Times editorial entitled "Time to Thaw U.S. Policy in Korea," February 4, 1991 —

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"North Korea has been threatened for decades with nuclear holocaust by the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea. It has three small research reactors and is planning to buy a power-generating plant. New facilities are under construction that may be used for testing nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration has suggested that at the current rate of work North Korea could develop nuclear weapons in 5-6 years.

"South Korea already has a well-developed nuclear power industry. It has 11 operating nuclear power plants and expects to build 5 more in the 1990s. South Korea abandoned its own nuclear weapons program in the 1970s under U.S. pressure. It has the technology to start a new program.

"Clearly it is time for action to help North and South Korea gain control of the nuclear genie while they can still keep it bottled up. Withdrawing our nuclear weapons and making sure South Korea does not start building them would remove any reason for the North Koreans to develop their own. North Korea has already signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. U.S. withdrawal would put strong pressure on them to conclude their negotiations on International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of their nuclear facilities.

"There is no military requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons that cannot be met with conventional forces. Neither the President nor the U.S. public are likely to approve the actual use of nuclear weapons in Korea."

"The first step to bring true stability to the Korean Peninsula is to withdraw

our tactical nuclear weapons. The second step is to withdraw the 2nd Infantry Division. The third step is to withdraw our Air Force units. Maintaining the 1954 U.S.-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty until reunification is well underway will continue to provide South Korea with a measure of extra confidence in its security. There is nothing in the treaty declaring that U.S. forces must be stationed in South Korea."

— "Mission Accomplished in Korea: Bringing U.S. Troops Home," The Defense Monitor, Vol. XIX, Number 2, 1990 —

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"U.S. nuclear weapons in Korea have no military utility, are unnecessary, and only serve counter-productive purposes. They have always been justified as the ultimate deterrent to a North Korean attack. Yet, in contrast to Europe, there is no nuclear threat from North Korea. There are no nuclear weapons in North Korea, thus no need for U.S. nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by the North."

— Stephen Goose, Legislative Assistant for Foreign and Military Affairs to Rep. Robert Mrazek (D-N.Y.), former senior analyst with the Center for Defense Information, from his article contained in the book "Two Koreas — One Future?" published by the American Friends Service Committee —

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"Removing nuclear weapons from the South also would ease North-South tensions significantly. Although North Korea has nuclear-capable weapons, such as the FROG-VII missile, the United States does not contend that Pyongyang has a nuclear capability or is storing nuclear warheads. The rationale for the U.S. nuclear presence in the South is that it deters a conventional attack by the North's larger army. Many specialists, citing the conventional balance, challenge this argument. But in any case, nuclear weapons do not have to be deployed and stored in Korea itself because they could be brought to the scene rapidly from nearby aircraft carriers and other ships."

— Solig Harrison, a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, from his article contained in Foreign Policy magazine, No. 69, Summer 1987 —

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Considering that efforts are urgently needed to reduce tension in the North East Asia region to prevent a renewed outbreak of war and to create a climate favorable for reunification so that the Korean people may proceed to resolve their national question without undue external pressure of interference,

the NCCUSA shall:

1. *Continue to press for* progress in direct negotiations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in order to reduce tensions between the two superpowers whose bilateral relations directly affect the political climate of the world and of this region; and recognizing that other major powers in this area can play a constructive role in helping to create a positive climate conducive for such talks, *urge* the U.S. government to be sensitive to their special interests and relationships in the peninsula.
2. *Urge* the United States Government to refrain from apllying pressures on Japan to assume a regional military role, especially in the light of its history of military conquest and colonial rule on the peninsula, and out of respect for the efforts of the Japanese people to safeguard Article 9 of their Constitution, which renounces war as a means of settling international disputes; and to encourage the government of Japan to open more adequate channels of communication with the D.P.R.K.
3. *Press for* the negotiated withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear weapons in Korea and all U.S. and U.S.S.R. nuclear weapons targeted on Korea, and *press for* the creation of a nuclear-free zone in North East Asia.
4. *Call for* the suspension or substantial reduction in scale of military exercises in both sides of Korea and their eventual cessation as a way of eliminating gestures which may be interpreted as provocative.
5. *Call for* a mutually balanced reduction of the military forces of both the D.P.R.K. and the R.O.K., and a commitment by all parties not to introduce new levels of weaponry into the peninsula in order to enhance peace and security and to allow for a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea.

— From the policy statement on "Peace and the Reunification of Korea" adopted by the Governing Board of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (NCCUSA), November 6, 1986 —

Appendix B

South Koreans Speak Out

In the late 1980s, South Korean citizens from all walks of life began to question the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the country. Their voices for withdrawal of atomic weapons are getting stronger from year to year. Here are some of their voices:

Mass Cultural Movements Should be Developed into Anti-Nuclear Movements

"Our future movements (mass cultural movements in South Korea) should be developed into movements in which work, play and struggle are integrated, just like the Tonghak Armymen worked on the field, danced and fought with bamboo spears. For instance, I think, it is necessary, as I said above, to link producer cooperatives in the countryside with consumer cooperatives in urban areas, and develop anti-pollution movements into anti-nuclear ones, and further to unify small groups of workers and organize them into consumer and labor mutual aid associations."

— Hwang Suk Young, writer, from his comment contributed to the Japanese monthly magazine "Sekai (world)," June 1986 —

All Nuclear Weapons Should Be Withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula

(1) In order to prevent war and ease tension in the Korean Peninsula, it is necessary to conclude a peace treaty as early as possible to put an end to the state of hostility, and for this purpose, it is necessary for the North

and South Korean authorities, the United States, China and other participants in the Korean War to start negotiations to change the truce agreement to a peace treaty.

(2) When a peace treaty is concluded, when the restoration of trust between South and North Korea is confirmed, and when peace and stability are internationally guaranteed over the whole of the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. armed forces stationed in South Korea should be withdrawn from there and the United Nations Command should be dissolved.

(3) Excessive military rivalries are the most important factor for obstructing the peaceful unification of South and North Korea, and have an adverse effect on thier economic development. Therefore, South and North Korea should reduce their military strength through mutual negotiation, and military spending be reduced to increase spending on peaceful industries.

(4) No nuclear weapons should be used under any circumstances. Both South and North Korea should endeavor to eliminate the root cause of a possibility of nuclear weapons being used in the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, nuclear weapons deployed in the Korean Peninsula and those directed against it should be withdrawn.

— From the "Declaration for National Unification and Peace," by the National Council of Churches of Korea, February 29, 1988 —

All Nuclear Weapons Should Be Withdrawn

"The ultimate cause of the social sufferings and tribulations our nation is now undergoing, is the national division caused by the external forces. We wholeheartedly support the Declaration of Christian Churches for National Unification and Peace, which demands the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from South Korea, conversion of the Armistice Agreement to a peace treaty, withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea and dissolution of the U.N. Command in an atmosphere of restoration of trust between South and North Korea.

"We propose to establish committees for the study of unification and peace in the organizations of Christian women in South Korea and to hold talks with Christian women in North Korea.

"We will also strengthen solidarity with the peace movements of the world for the sake of withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from South Korea and for the cause of total abolition of nuclear weapons in the world."

— From the "Declaration of the South Korean Council of Women Theologians," May 2, 1988 —

Appendix C

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure in South Korea

South Korea is the only forward U.S. base for storage of nuclear weapons in Asia, housing 151 warheads. The nuclear weapons are stored at one site and support the U.S. Army and Air Force. The U.S. and South Korean militaries are fully integrated in terms of planning and operations.

Camp Ames, Taejon	HQ, Korean Ammunition Management System: main Army nuclear weapons support unit, with 78th Ordnance Company providing maintenance and assembly and U.S. Army Security Company providing security, nuclear warheads are stored at Kunsan AB, where the Army maintains a "maximum security area"
Camp Casey, Tongduchon	HQ, 2d Infantry Division: main U.S. combat unit in Korea, with both nuclear artillery and ADM missions
Camp Castle, Tongduchon	2d Engineer Bn, 2d Infantry Division: possible ADM mission
Camp Essayons, Uijongbu	6th Bn, 37th Field Artillery: 8-inch artillery of 2d Infantry Division, nuclear facilities include "Emergency Action Facility" to receive nuclear release orders
Camp Page, Chunchon	former HQ of 4th Missile Command which controlled Army Honest John missiles
Camp Red Cloud, Uijongbu	HQ, ROK/U.S. Combined Field Army: formerly HQ, I Coprs (ROK/U.S. Group), joint command of a nine division force including the 2d Infantry Division

Camp Stanley, Uijongbu	HQ, 2d Infantry Division Artillerry • 2 M-198 and 1 M-109 nuclear-capable artillery battalions, nuclear facilities include "Emergency Action Facility" and Special Weapons Training Facility
Changsan	AF LORAN-C/D Monitor Station: part of the "Commando Lion" chain used for tactical long-range navigation and target location • Coast Guard LORAN-C Monitor Station: serving the northwest Pacific chain
Choejong-San	Det 2, 1st Space Wing: GEODSS satellite tracking station
Hwedok	former HQ for 833rd Ordnance Company and nuclear weapons storage site prior to relocation to Seneca Army Depot, NY in 1979
Koon-Ni	Nightmare range: nuclear air-to-surface aircraft training range
***Kunsan AB**	8th Tactical Fighter Wing: nuclear-capable F-16, replaced F-4D in 1981 • nuclear weapons storage site for Army and Air Force in South Korea, weapons stored include 60 bombs, 40 8-inch and 30 155mm artillery projectiles and 21 ADMs • Commando Escort station
Kwangju AB	AF LORAN-C/D Station: part of the "Commando Lion" network used for tactical long-range navigation and targeting • AF Korea alternate command center
Osan AB	314th Air Division/Air Forces Korea: top AF command in Korea, semi-hardened underground command center, the "Tree House" includes the joint ROK/U.S. Central Control Facility, an early warning and air defense center for South Korea and an "Emergency Action Facility" for receiving nuclear release orders • 51st Tactical Fighter Wing: nuclear-capable F-4E • SAC radar bomb scoring nuclear bombing practice site • Commando Escort station • AF LORAN-C/D Station: part of the "Commando Lion" network used for tactical long-range navigation and target location

South Korea

The only place in the world where nuclear weapons face a non-nuclear foe is South Korea. Nuclear bombs, artillery, and atomic demolitioin munitions are stored at Kunsan airbase and would be dispersed to a number of military units at the outbreak of hostilities. Korea is the only country where U.S. military forces are kept permanently at DEFCON (Denfense Readiness Condition) 4, one level above normal alert. (Source: "Nuclear Battlefields")

Pohang — AF LORAN-C/D Station: part of the "Commando Lion" network used for tactical long-range navigation and target location

Seoul — HQ, U.S. Forces Korea: sub-unified command of the Pacific Command, WWMCCS facilities include Nuclear Capabilities Plan, command facilities include "Emergency Action Console" for receiving nuclear release orders • ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command: highest U.S./ROK operational HQ in South Korea, military command of forces in wartime, integrated planning and staff in peacetime • HQ, Eighth U.S. Army: top Army command in Korea

Songnam — "Tango" Combined Communications Operations Center: underground command center for U.S. Forces Korea, including WWMCCS facilities and "Emergency Action Console" for receiving nuclear release orders

Songso — AN/GSC-39 satellite terminal, main communications link to Japan and Hawaii

Taegu AB	497th Tactical Fighter Squadron: nuclear-capable F-4E • Alternate Tactical Air Control Center for South Korea
Tobongsan	Tobongsan Ammunition Center (near Uijongbu): stand-by forward nuclear weapons storage site for 2d Infantry Division
Wongju, Kangwondo	Det 452, AFTAC: nuclear test detection station

(Source: "Nuclear Battlefields")

Appendix D

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stored in South Korea

The United States, in violation of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, began to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea in 1957. But details about U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea had not been well known until 1984 when an authoritative book on U.S. nuclear weapons was published by three Americans in the United States.

*"Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume I: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities" (**Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin and Milton M. Hoenig, Ballinger Publishing Company**) revealed for the first time what types of nuclear weapons the United States had deployed in South Korea as well as in other foreign countries.*

*As to nuclear warheads for NATO countries, they are provided by the U.S. under Programs of Cooperation (POC) — bilateral agreements between the U.S. and NATO countries involving the transfer and certification of nuclear capable delivery vehicles or the deployment of nuclear warheads on foreign soil for support of foreign forces. (**Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1980, the Department of Defense, Part 6, p.3426**)*

According to the book, the United States maintains POCs with nine nations: Belgium, Canada, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, South Korea, Turkey, The United Kingdom, and West Germany (now Germany) and has nuclear weapons deployed in each of those countries.

Here are details about nuclear weapons — warheads, bombs, artillery shells, missiles and delivery systems — deployed or thought to be deployed by the United States in South Korea:

Nuclear Warheads

W31

FUNCTION: Warhead for the HONEST JOHN (MGR-1B) battlefield support surface-to-surface missile (SSM) and the NIKE-HERCULES (MiM-14) surface-to-air missile (SAM)

WARHEAD MODIFICATIONS: W31 Mod 2 is used on NIKE-HERACULES

SPECIFICATIONS:

Yield: three yield options; 1-20 Kt range, possibly 2-20-40 Kt, most often referred to as 20 Kt

HONEST JOHN: three separate warhead sections, the M27, M47, and M48; each with a different yield

NIKE-HERCULES: two separate warhead sections deployed, the M22 and M97; "warheads are interchangeable."

Delivery Systems:

HONEST JOHN: dual capable mobile transporter erector vehicle

NIKE-HERCULES: dual capable launchers at fixed battery firing sites

W33

FUNCTION: Warhead for the M422 8-inch (203mm) artillery-fired atomic projectile (AFAP)

WARHEAD MODIFICATIONS: two warhead modifications deployed; one with low yield and one with high yeild

SPECIFICATIONS:

Yield: two yield options contained in two separate versions; sub Kt-12 Kt range; often referenced as 5-10 Kt

Delivery Systems: dual capable M110 self-propelled 8-inch howitzers, older 8-inch howitzers in Allied forces (M55 and M115)

Retirement Plans: The W33 will eventually be replaced by the enhanced radiation W79, which began production in 1981.

B43

FUNCTION: High-yield nuclear bomb capable of being delivered by most of the nuclear capable strategic and tactical aircraft in the U.S. inventory.

WARHEAD MODIFICATIONS: B43 Mod 0: without PAL; B43 Mod 1: fuzing radar set, with PAL

SPECIFICATIONS:

Yield: 1 Mt

Delivery Systems: internal or external carriage; B-52, FB-111, F-4, F-16, F-111, A-4, A-6, A-7

W45

FUNCTION: Warhead used in two configurations; in the TERRIER (RIM-2D) naval surface-to-air missile (SAM) and in the Medium Atomic Demolition Munition (MADM)

WARHEAD MODIFICATIONS: Mod 1: TERRIER; Mod 3: MADM; M167, M172, and M175 "atomic demolition charges" are known configurations

SPECIFICATIONS:

Yield:

TERRIER: reported as 1 Kt

MADM: 1-15 Kt range, probably three yields

Delivery Systems:

TERRIER: numerous dual capable TERRIER launching systems

MADM: vehicle and air/helicopter portable

W48

FUNCTION: Warhead for the M454 155mm Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile (AFAP).

WARHEAD MODIFICATIONS: W48 Mod 1 deployed

SPECIFICATIONS:

Yield: one sub kiloton yield option "very small"; probably 0.1 Kt; often incorrectly to as 1 Kt

Delivery Systems: dual capable M198 and M109 155mm howitzers; older 155mm howitzers in NATO and U.S. use

W54

FUNCTION: Low yield warhead once used in several configurations, currently used in the Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM)

WARHEAD MODIFICATIONS: two separate configurations; M129 and M159 "atomic demolition charges" are known.

SPECIFICATIONS:

Yield: very low; variable yield options of SADM in 0.01-1 Kt range, probably two yields; DAVY CROCKETT (W54-2) had a yield on the order of 0.25 Kt.

Delivery System: can be carried in a backpack by a single soldier

B61

FUNCTION: Lightweight, multipurpose thermonuclear "modern tactical bomb" in 6 modifications used on a wide variety

of aircraft, including strategic bombers.

WARHEAD MODIFICATIONS: Mods 0-5 with differing safety features and delivery capabilities

SPECIFICATIONS:

Yield: four yield options, 100-500 Kt range; possibly low (10 Kt) option; maximum of "a few hundred kilotons"

Delivery Systems: usable on any U.S. aircraft that can deliver a nuclear bomb, both strategic and tactical aircraft: A-4, A-6, A-7, F-4, F-16, F-111, FB-111, B-52; planned for use on the B-1B.

W70

FUNCTION: Warhead in the Army LANCE (MGM-52) short-range, highly mobile, guided surface-to-surface tactical ballistic missile.

WARHEAD MODIFICATIONS: W70-1: presently developed, selectable fission yield; W70-2: presently deployed improved selectable fission yield; W70-3: presently deployed, enhanced radiation version; W70-4: dual capable fission/ER version, with insertable tritium reservoir to convert to enhanced radiation yield, deferred in favor of the W70-3

SPECIFICATIONS:

Yield: W70-1/2: sub 1-100 Kt in three yield options; 10 Kt often referenced as typical fission yield; 60 Kt as intermediate yield; W70-3: Two yield options, one slightly less than 1 Kt, the other slightly more than 1 Kt, both consisting of about 40 percent fission and 60 percent fusion. A program was revealed in FY 1980 to give the LANCE (W70-1/2) warhead "a more useful spread of yields."

Delivery Systems: dual capable LANCE missile launcher on tracked vehicles

W79

FUNCTION: Enhanced radiation warhead for the M753 improved Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile (AFAP) for 8-inch (203mm) artillery.

WARHEAD MODIFICATIONS: W70-0: dual capable fission/ER version, cancelled in favor of ER version; W79-1: currently deployed enhanced radiation version with insertable ER components

SPECIFICATIONS:

Yield:

W79-0: up to 10 Kt selectable yield

W79-1: probably 1 Kt; three yield options ranging from substantially under 1 Kt to about 2 Kt; the lowest yield option will be 50 percent fission and 50 percent fusion, the highest yield option will be 70 or 75 percent fusion. "More yield options" than W33

Delivery Systems: dual capable 8-inch howitzers, including the standard M110 and older M115 in Allied use

Nuclear Capable Aircraft

F-4 PHANTOM II

DESCRIPTION: Two-seat, twin-engine, all-weather, supersonic, multimission fighter, used by the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.

Nuclear capable versions: F-4C/D/E

SPECIFICATIONS: (F-4E)

Speed: (max) 1500 mph (Mach 2.27) at 40,000 ft

Range: 660 mi (1060 km) (combat radius); 1000 mi (1610 km)

	ground attack
Aerial Refueling Capability:	yes
Crew:	2
NUCLEAR WEAPONS:	three pylons (centerline and wings) can carry nuclear weapons (one each) weighing up to 2170 1b; B28RE, B43, B57, B61, B83; possibly GENIE in strategic interceptor force
Locations:	Osan AB, Taegu AB

F-16 FIGHTING FALCON

DESCRIPTION:	Lightweight, single-seat, single-engine, supersonic, multi-mission, air-to-air and air-to-ground fighter used by the Air Force and NATO Air Forces.
Nuclear capable versions:	F-16A/B, F-16C/D (after 1984), F-16E (derivative fighter)
SPECIFICATIONS:	(F-16A)
Speed:	1400 mph (max); 1520 mph (max)
Range:	575 mi (combat radius)
Aerial Refueling Capability:	yes
Crew:	1
NUCLEAR WEAPONS:	B43, B61; reported capable of delivering up to five nuclear bombs on five of nine hardpoints; later report indicates 3rd, 5th, and 7th stations used for nuclear bombs; standard weapons configuration is one or two nuclear weapons; general profile is one B61; the B57 is prohibited from use on F-16A/B aircraft.

Location: Kunsan AB

EDITOR'S NOTE: General Merrill A. McPeak, commander of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces, disclosed in a May 16, 1990 seminar in Seoul that a new U.S. squadron of 24 F-16 fighters modified for night operations with the Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIN) system would be deployed in South Korea. The 24 F-16 fighter-bombers arrived in South Korea last year. In addition, the United States and South Korea plan to co-produce 120 state-of-the-art U.S. F-18 fighter-bombers. The F18/A-18 is the latest high-performance nuclear capable aircraft.

Army Nuclear Weapons

Missiles and Rockets

HONEST JOHN (MGR-1B)

DESCRIPTION: Short-range, free-flight (unguided), mobile, nuclear capable surface-to-surface, solid propellant, ballistic rocket used by the Greek and Turkish Armies, and the Army National Guard.

DUAL CAPABLE: yes

NUCLEAR WARHEADS: one W31 in M47 and M48 nuclear warhead sections; 1-20 Kt range (see W31)

EDITOR'S NOTE: Last active U.S. HONEST JOHN battalion in South Korea retired in 1979 with missiles and equipment turned over to South Korean forces. Presumably nuclear warheads remain in South Korea under U.S. control.

LANCE (MGM-52C)

DESCRIPTION Short-range, Army all-weather, highly mobile, guided

nuclear-capable surface-to-surface ballistic missile.

DUAL CAPABLE: yes

NUCLEAR WARHEADS: one W70 in M234 nuclear warhead section; five different warhead sections for missile, two tactical (one nuclear, one nonnuclear), two trainers and one practice; 1-100 Kt range (fission mods); circa 1 Kt (ER mod) (see W70)

EDITOR'S NOTE: The U.S. Army deployed a battery of Lance missiles to South Korea on February 9, 1987, which became operational in early March.

NIKE-HERCULES (MiM-14)

DESCRIPTION: Medium-range, fixed, guided, surface-to-air nuclear-capable missile used by the Army in West Germany and widely deployed in the following NATO countries: Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and West Germany.

DUAL CAPABLE: yes

NUCLEAR WARHEADS: one W31, 1 Kt range (see W31)

EDITOR'S NOTE: The South Korean Army has MiM-14B NIKE-HERCULES missiles.

M109 155mm Gun

DESCRIPTION: Heavy, self-propelled 155mm artillery gun used by the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, NATO, and allied armies

MODIFICATIONS: M109A1 (SP), M109A2 (SP), M109A3 (SP), M109G (SP)

NUCLEAR WARHEADS: W48, 0.1 Kt yield (see W48); compatible with W82.

M198 155mm Gun

DESCRIPTION: Medium, towed 155mm artillery gun used by light units of the Army and Marine Corps

MODIFICATIONS: none

NUCLEAR WARHEADS: W48, 0.1 Kt yield; compatible with W82

M110 8-inch (203mm) Gun

DESCRIPTION: Heavy, self-propelled 8-inch (203mm) artillery howitzer used by the Army, Marine Corps, NATO and allied armies.

NUCLEAR WARHEADS: W33, sub-12 Kt; compatible with W79

W82

FUNCTION: Warhead for the XM-785 Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile (AFAP) for 155mm artillery, to replace the current W48/M454 AFAP.

WARHEAD MODIFICATIONS: Warhead is built in components, allowing easy conversion from fission yield to enhanced radiation yield.

SPECIFICATIONS:

Yield: less than 2 Kt; exceeds that of the 0.1 Kt W48; capable of accepting an ER option convertible in the field

Delivery System: dual capable M198 and M109/A1/A2/A3 155mm howitzers; older 155mm howitzers

Atomic Demolition Munitions

The U.S. Army (and Marine Corps) currently have two atomic demolitions munitions (ADMs) deployed; the Medium ADM (MADM) and the Special ADM

(SADM). The MADM is a 1-15 Kt nuclear land mine weighing some 400 pounds, first deployed in 1965. The SADM is a sub-1 Kt nuclear land mine weighing some 150 pounds, first deployed in 1964. MADM is emplaced by engineer teams and carried by jeeps and helicopters. SADM is man portable and emplaced by special forces and commandos teams behind the enemy lines. Approximately 600 ADMs are estimated to be deployed, mostly in Europe, South Korea, Guam, and the United States.

(Source: Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume I: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities)